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CASE COMMENTS

devise restrictions were designed to afford. Previous homestead provisions were characterized as insuring for dependent family members
a shelter and refuge from want.2 2 The increased mobility of individuals,

however, has had a scattering effect on the household 23 with the consequence that fewer persons look to the homestead for subsistence.
Moreover, a number of developments have taken place which lessen the
need for the economic security homestead devise restraints guaranteed
in the past. Social security and other welfare laws, life insurance, and
enhanced employment opportunities have all contributed to the declining importance of homestead laws. Given these developments, it
is doubtful today that anyone other than the spouse or minor child
requires homestead protection.
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To VOTE AND PENALIZE RIGHT To TRAVEL.-Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Three weeks after moving to Tennessee, James F. Blumstein
was refused registration as a voter on the ground that state law1 required a year's residence in the state and three months' residence in
the county as prerequisites to voting. After exhausting his state
remedies, Blumstein brought an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of these provisions. A three-judge court
held that the durational residence requirements were unnecessary to
further any compelling interest of Tennessee's and, so tested, were
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on substantially
similar grounds.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall,3 the Court first held that
22. See, e.g., Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945); Collins v. Collins,
150 Fla. 374, 7 So. 2d 443 (1942).
23. As of 1960 less than 3% of the rural farm households had a grandchild
present; 40.6% had a child present, 83% of the children being under the age of 18.
Among the urban households, 34.7% had children present, 89% of these children being under the age of 18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960,
VOL.

1, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

pt. 11, at 353-57.

1. See TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1971).
2. Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
3. Mr. Justice Marshall wrote for himself and four other members of the Court.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, and the Chief Justice dissented. Justices
Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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the appropriate standard for review under the equal protection clause
was whether the requirements were necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.4 This stricter test was proper because two fundamental
constitutional rights were involved: durational residence requirements
not only denied some residents the right to vote,5 but did so based
solely upon the fact of recent interstate travel. 6
The Court then examined in detail Tennessee's claimed justifications for its durational residence requirements. The state first asserted
that the waiting periods tended to maintain the integrity of the
electoral process, serving as a fraud preventative by distinguishing
bona fide residents from nonresidents. This contention the Court
found unconvincing in light of the fact that Tennessee allowed voters
to register until thirty days before an election and, in so doing, to
establish their compliance with residence and other requirements by
7
simply swearing an oath to that effect:
As long as the State relies on the oath-swearing system to establish
qualifications, a durational residence requirement adds nothing to
a simple residence requirement in the effort to stop fraud. The
nonresident intent on committing election fraud will as quickly
and effectively swear that he has been a resident for the requisite
period of time as he would swear that he was simply a resident.
Nor could the three-month and one-year periods be justified in terms
of the time required to investigate a voter's sworn claims since Tennessee, in permitting registration up to thirty days before an election,
gave itself no more than that period of time in which to conduct an
investigation. 8 The Court also rejected the arguments that durational
4. 405 U.S. at 335.
5. Id. at 336-37. In a memorandum opinion, Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
afj'g mem. 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), the Court had earlier affirmed a district
court decision upholding Maryland's one-year durational residence requirement for
voting. The equal protection test applied by the district court was whether the requirement was reasonably related to a permissible state interest. 234 F. Supp. at 724-25.
The Dunn Court disposed of Drueding by stating that "if it was not clear then, it is
certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute that 'place[s]
a condition on the exercise of the right to vote."' 405 U.S. at 337.
6. 405 U.S. at 338-42.
7. Id. at 346.
8. The Court noted that the record did not reflect any effort on Tennessee's part
routinely to go "behind the would-be voter's oath to determine his qualifications."
405 U.S. at 346. Moreover, even if durational residence periods were used for investigative purposes, Tennessee had failed to demonstrate that its three-month and one-year
periods were "necessary." The Court conceded that "[flixing a constitutionally acceptable
period is surely a matter of degree," but concluded that "30 days appears to be an
ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud-and a year, or three months, too much." Id. at 348.

1973]

CASE COMMENTS

residence requirements were permissible as an administrative device
for distinguishing residents from nonresidents and that they reduced
the likelihood of fraud by forcing the nonresident intent on voting
fraudulently to remain in a false locale for three months or a year.
While in operation this device might exclude all nonresidents from
voting, it also excluded by conclusive presumption many persons who
were unquestionably bona fide residents, at least as Tennessee defined
that term in other contexts. 9 Classification in this fashion, the Court
concluded, was "all too imprecise." 10 Finally, the Court adverted to
a variety of other provisions of Tennessee law dealing with voter
fraud, noting that "[w]here a State has available such remedial action
to supplement its voter registration system, it can hardly argue that
broadly imposed political disabilities such as durational residence requirements are needed to deal with the evils of fraud."'1
Tennessee's second major contention-that the waiting periods
helped to insure knowledgeable voters-comprised three subsidiary
arguments, all of which the Court rejected. The claim that the requirements offered some assurance that the voter was a "member of
the community" confused, in the Court's view, a bona fide residence
requirement with a durational residence requirement. The state's
interest "in limiting the franchise to bona fide members of the community . . . does not justify or explain the exclusion from the
franchise of persons . . . because they are recent rather than long-

time residents."' 12 Similarly, Tennessee's "common interest in the community's government" argument failed. This the Court took to mean
a desire on the state's part to impress upon voters the "local viewpoint," a clearly impermissible purpose.' 3 Finally, the Court rejected
Tennessee's claim that a year's residence in the state and three months'
residence in the county were likely to insure that voters exercised
4
their franchise in an intelligent fashion.1
9. The Court stressed the fact that there was no dispute as to Blumstein's status
as a bona fide resident. The state's basic test for bona fide residence was "(1) an intention to stay indefinitely in a place . . . joined with (2) some objective indication
consistent with that intent ...." 405 U.S. at 351 n.22. But see Newburger v. Peterson,
344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972) (indefinite intention test held violative of equal protection clause as overly restrictive).
10. 405 U.S. at 351.
11. Id. at 353-54.
12. Id. at 354.
13. Id. at 354-56, citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970); Hall v. Beals,
396 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969); and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
14. Assuming without deciding the permissibility of this purpose, the Court found
that durational residence requirements were too imprecise to achieve it. To reach this
conclusion, the Court took judicial notice of several "facts": such requirements in prac-
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Virtually every state now imposes durational residence requirements for voting-typically of six months or more"--and the most
obvious effect of the Dunn decision is to lay them all open to invalidation.' Beyond stating that thirty days was enough and three
months too much, the Court declined to say what exact period of effective durational residence a state may impose through the device of closing its voter registration books prior to an election. But it was plainly
impressed by the fact that Congress, in enacting the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, had prohibited the closing of voter registration
books more than thirty days prior to presidential and vice-presidential
elections.' 7 Presumably a state could cut off registration for as long a
period in excess of thirty days as it could show was necessary to
further some compelling state interest-such as the prevention of
fraud in the electoral process, for example.1 8 But the Court evidently
has a low opinion of the likelihood that this could be done, for it
noted specifically that the various administrative tasks which a state
might perform in checking voters' qualifications were relatively simple
and easy to accomplish. 19 After Dunn, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that any period in excess of thirty days will probably be
invalidated 20 and that for all practical purposes the Court has merged
tice obviously exclude many fully informed voters while permitting long-time residents
with no knowledge of election issues to vote; recent arrivals who take the trouble to
register to vote are likely to be well informed politically; and exposure to candidates
and issues is greatest during the last thirty days before an election. 405 U.S. at 358.
Finally, the Court reasoned that the knowledge-promoting character of waiting periods
applied in discriminatory fashion to new arrivals only. This surely ignores the fact that
long-time residents by definition have had whatever benefits may accrue through
exposure over time to local issues and concerns.

15. See 19

THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES

1972-73.

at

36-37 (1972); MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil
Rights, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 93, 95-98 (1969).
16. See Hinnant v. Sebesta, 346 F. Supp. 913 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (invalidating
Florida's sixty-day durational residence requirement).
17. See 405 U.S. at 344, 348 & n.19. Cf. 84 Stat. 316, 317, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1 (b), (d)
(1970). Congress concluded that any period in excess of thirty days did not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling state interest. 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l (a) (6)
(1970). The Court said: "There is no reason to think that what Congress thought was
unnecessary to prevent fraud in presidential elections should not also be unnecessary
in the context of other elections." 405 U.S. at 348-49 n.19.
18. The Court characterized the prevention of fraud as "a legitimate and compelling
government goal." 405 U.S. at 345.
19. See 405 US. at 348.
20. In Hinnant v. Sebesta, 346 F. Supp. 913 (M.D. Fla. 1972), a district court struck
down, on the authority of Dunn, Florida's sixty-day durational residence requirement,

despite the argument that "Florida is virtually unique among the states in that it
attracts a huge number of part-time winter residents, tourists and other transients so that
the likelihood of fraudulent registration is enhanced." Id. at 915. The court stated:
If the state actually closed its registration books sixty days prior to state and
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the voter registration cutoff period for state and local elections with
the thirty-day period fixed by Congress for presidential elections.
Of greater significance may be the impact of the constitutional
right to travel discussed in Dunn on other forms of durational residence requirements.21 In Shapiro v. Thompson1 2 the Court invalidated
a durational requirement for state welfare assistance, holding that the
statutory waiting period abridged the freedom of travel. In Dunn,
the Court made clear that Shapiro could not be read, as some lower
courts had done, to require a showing of actual deterrence of travel
or even of an intent to achieve that effect. 22 Rather, a claimant need
only show that the exercise of the right to travel has been conditioned
or penalized by the challenged classification. 24 Virtually all durational
local elections and, in addition, could forcefully demonstrate that this period of
time was necessary to verify the eligibility of electors and otherwise accomplish
the many administrative tasks preparatory to conducting the election itself, then
its argument in support of a sixty day period might have weight. But just as
Tennessee did in Blumstein, Florida has elected to permit registration until thirty
days before the election, and in so doing has already demonstrated that the thirty
day period is sufficient for administrative preparation.
Id. The probability of invalidation becomes a virtual certainty in states like
Florida and Tennessee which have already adopted a thirty-day closing period and
which permit qualifications to be established by oath or affirmation. As of 1970, forty
states kept their voting rolls open for registration for some purposes until at least
thirty days prior to presidential elections. See 116 Cong. Rec. 6995 (1970).
21. In addition to voting, other areas in which durational residence requirements
have been used are admittance to public housing, e.g., Cole v. Housing Authority, 312
F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aff'd 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); veterans preference statutes, e.g.,
Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971); professional licensing, e.g.,
Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); divorce, e.g.,
Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971); and sporting licenses, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 370.01 (1) (1971). For a discussion of durational residence requirements
in some nonvoting areas, see Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 134, 140-46, 148-55 (1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare
and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989, 1003-04, 1008-12 (1969).
22. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23. 405 U.S. at 339-40. See, e.g., Fontham v. McKeithan, 336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La.
1971) (voting requirements) (lack of intent and actual deterrence); Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (out-of-state tuition differentials) (no "specific objective" to deter or deterrence of "any appreciable number"); Lane v. McGarry, 320 F.
Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (admittance to public housing) ("insubstantiality of the
impact ... on the right').
24. 405 U.S. at 341. Of course it must also appear that the condition or penalty is
not imposed by a requirement necessary to further a compelling state interest. Moreover, what constitutes a penalty or condition on the right to travel is far from clear.
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 US. 707 (1972),
the Court sustained a one-dollar service charge imposed on each departing commercial
airline passenger by the state airport authority. The levy was there characterized as
an "aid" rather than a "penalty" on interstate travel. The Court reached this conclusion
with the explanation that the funds thus generated were used to develop and maintain the publicly financed airport which made air travel possible.
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residence requirements" condition or penalize free movement by
placing the new resident in a state at a disadvantage in comparison
with the long-time resident. The right-to-travel standard which has
emerged from Shapiro and Dunn would now seem to make use of
26
these devices for any purpose highly suspect.
Consumer ProtectionESTATE CLOSING Is

TRUTH IN LENDING -

DISCLOSURE AT REAL

NOT TIMELY AND FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE

OF THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING AcT.-Bissette v. Colonial
Mortgage Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1972).

The Calvin Bissettes entered into an agreement with a builderdeveloper for the purchase of a one-family home, the agreement con25. Waiting periods applicable to new arrivals in a state may not in terms be
"durational" residence requirements. They may rather purport to distinguish residents
from nonresidents, creating an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence so far as entitlement to some particular benefit is concerned. The Court has thus far dealt only
with durational residence requirements and has been careful to emphasize that fact.
In Dunn, for example, the Court stated that "[n]othing said today is meant to cast
doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements." 405 U.S. at 342 n.13. The question arises whether a state can
distinguish residents from nonresidents in terms of presence within the state for a
period of time without in effect creating a durational residence requirement that would
then be subject to testing by the compelling state interest standard. Certainly states
which have a less burdensome test of bona fide residence-like Tennessee's "intention
to stay indefinitely in a place" coupled with "some objective indication consistent with
that intent"- will experience logical difficulty in explaining why a resident-nonresident
classification in terms of time within the state is anything other than a durational
residence requirement by another name.
26. Out-of-state tuition differentials represent one of the most widely used and
economically significant forms of durational residence requirement. See generally Note,
The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1139 (1971). Attacks
on tuition differentials have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); Bryan v. Regents, 188 Cal, 559, 205 Pac. 107 (1922);
Commentary, 24 ALA. L. Rav. 147 (1971); But see Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D.
Conn. 1972). In the Starns case, the Court in a memorandum opinion affirmed a district
court's application of the traditional "rational relation" equal protection test to uphold a
Minnesota statute which created "an irrebuttable presumption that any person who
has not continuously resided in Minnesota for one year immediately before his entrance
to the University is a nonresident for tuition purposes." 326 F. Supp. at 237. Shapiro
was distinguished by the district court in two respects: the court found no significant
evidence that the claimants' right to travel had actually been deterred, and Shapiro
was said to involve immediate and pressing needs relating to the preservation of life
and health. Id. at 237-38. But the Starns affirmance came before Dunn. Given the Court's
rejection in Dunn of an actual deterrence requirement and its careful elaboration of
the right to travel as an independent basis necessitating application of the compelling
state interest test, it seems improbable that the Starns rationale will be adequate to
dispose of this issue should it again come before the Court.

